In quantum cryptography, a quantum one-way permutation is a one-to-one and onto (secure unitary) mapping that is easy to compute on every input, but hard to invert given the image of a random input. Levin [Probl. Inf. Transm., vol. 39 (1): 92-103 (2003)] has conjectured that the operator g(a, x) = (a, f (x) + ax), where f is any length-preserving function and a, x ∈ GF 2 x , is an information-theoretically secure permutation within a polynomial factor. Here, we prove that Levin ′ s one-way permutation is a quantum operator that is secure because the probability of inverting it approaches zero faster than the multiplicative inverse of any positive polynomial p(x) over the Boolean ring of all subsets of x. Our result demonstrates by well-known theorems that existence of one-way functions implies existence of a quantum one-way permutation that cannot be inverted in subexponential time in the worst case.
Introduction.
One of the remarkable effects of (pseudo)randomness is breaking the symmetries inherent in many natural and artificial phenomena [1] . Because one-way permutations are quite heavily involved in the generation of (pseudo)randomness, they are seen as (pseudo)random generators themselves [2] . In the following, we will analyze Levin ′ s construction [3] that addresses the existence of a specific one-way permutation. We will show that such a one-way permutation is a unitary operator that breaks its own symmetry, yielding a quantum cryptography protocol that is polynomially secure.
Preliminaries: Consider the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) scenario [4] , where two spatially separated parties labeled Alice and Bob can accept binary inputs a, x ∈ {0, 1} and getting output bits a', x'∈ {0, 1}. We can generate correlations between the output values and the input bits of a PR (Popescu-Rohrlich) box from a stochastic mechanism that depends on the temporal order of the inputs [5, 6] . Suppose that the input a is the temporal parameter, a control bit so that a' occurs before x'. Then, for the group homomorphism {1, −1, ×} → {0, 1, ⊕}, the condition a':= 0 and x':= 0 ⊕ a ∧ x or a':= 1 and x'=: 1 ⊕ a ∧ x produces the PR correlations a'⊕x':= a ∧ x, where ⊕ is the addition modulo 2 (XOR) and field's multiplication corresponds to the logical AND operation (Eq. 1). Notice that this map between two groups can be written as a 2-ary function, which respects the group structure, defined for all possible input values (total function) g : (a, x) → (a':= a, x':= f ⊕ a ∧ x), with f = {0, 1} and 0 ∼ 1 or 1 ∼ −1, so that the non-signaling system produce the PR box characterized by the following (conditional) probability distribution:
Pr( a, x /a ′ , x ′ ) = 1 /2, a'⊕x':= a ∧ x 0, otherwise whence the input state of g can only be guessed with negligible probability from its output state.
1.1. Definition. Let g : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be a length-preserving (total 2-ary) function that is easy to compute on every input but hard to invert given the image of a random input [7, 8] . The function g is called strongly one-way if and only if the probability Pr of inverting g is negligible (Eq. 2). Pr is negligible if it approaches zero faster than the multiplicative inverse of any positive polynomial:
where A is any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm [9] . In other words, a bad event that accurs with negligible probability Pr g −1 g←g < 1 /poly would be highly unlikely to occur even if we repeated the experiment polynomially many times. Otherwise, a function is called weakly one-way if Pr g −1 g←g > 1 /poly, i.e., if an event that occurs with noticeable probability occurs almost always when the experiment is repeated a polynomial number of times.
1.1.1. Remark. Inputs of g(a, x) = (a, f (x) + ax) have ≤ 1 siblings on average for any length-preserving f and a, x ∈ GF 2 x (see in [3] ):
i) The function f is length-preserving if for every x ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that the length of the input is the same as the length of the output.
ii) The output f (x) + ax can be replaced with another hash function, a function that is used to map data of arbitrary sizes to data of fixed sizes.
iii) x = length(x), and GF 2 is the Galois Field of two elements.
1.1.2. Conjecture. The above g is one-way, for any owf (one-way function) f , and has the same (within a polynomial factor) security (see in [3] ): i) This security scheme is provably secure if the probability of inverting g grows asymptotically no faster than the multiplicative inverse of any positive polynomial p(x) for all large enough x .
ii) The polynomial p(x) is positive over GF 2 x if p(x) > 0 for every x ∈ GF 2 x .
Proof.
The function g(a, x) with a, x ∈ GF 2 x is known as the universal one-way function [10] . The question of whether one-way functions exist can be reduced to the question of whether this specific permutation (i.e., a length-preserving 1-1 function) is one-way.
2.1. Definition. Given a permutation of n elements g : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n}, its permutation matrix is a square binary (orthogonal) matrix that has exactly one entry of 1 in each row and each column and 0 ′ s elsewhere, whose elements are (n = x )-bit arrays that can be represented as polynomials over GF 2 x [11] .
For instance, to construct the finite field GF 2 length=3 -a Galois extension of GF 2 that represents the coordinates of the vertices defining a three-dimensional hypercube in which the sides are one unit in length-, we need to choose an irreducible polynomial of degree 3 [12, 13] . Table 1 . Logical operator precedence. For a = N OT (x), g(a, x) = (a, (x 2 ⊕ 1) ⊕ ((x 2 ⊕ 1) ∧ x 2 )). Otherwise, g(a, x) = (a, x ⊕ (x ∧ x)). 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 (AND)
Let the Table 1 be the polynomial arithmetic modulo x 3 + x + 1. Over the finite field with characteristic 2, the field ′ s multiplication operation corresponds to the logical AND gate, and the field ′ s addition operation corresponds to the logical XOR gate. Hence, g(a, x) = (a, f (x) ⊕ (a ∧ x)):
i) For sibling = 1 (even input), x = a implies that f (x) = x[(I(x)]; consequently, g(a, x) = (a, x 2 ⊕ x) because x = x 2 over the finite field with characteristic 2.
ii) For sibling < 1 (odd input), x = a implies that f (x) = x 2 ⊕ 1[N OT (x)]; consequently, g(a, x) = (a, x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1) because x ⊕ 1 = x 2 ⊕ 1 over the finite field with characteristic 2 (see Table 1 ).
Note that
as g 22 = 1 and g 12 = g 32 = g 42 = 0 for g(0, 1) = (0, 1). In the same way, for g(1, 1) = (1, 0), g 34 = 1 and g 14 = g 24 = g 34 = 0. Therefore, the function g is represented by the permutation matrix:
This covariance matrix form of standardized random variables denotes the average over the possible outcomes of all measurements may take on together according to the conditional joint-probability distribution. Such a matrix form of total 2ary unitary operator, where the NOT gate (fourth quadrant) corresponds to the Pauli matrix (σ 1 ), is the controlled-NOT function defined for all possible input values, where a is the control variable and x is the target variable. For a = x, g : |a ⊗ |x → |a ⊗ |x 2 ⊕ x and, for a = x, g :
2.2.
Theorem. Let (Ω, F , Pr) be a Kolmogorov probability space with sample space Ω, event space F , and and probability measure Pr. Let a, x be random variables, hence, the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality for correlations | · (0,0) + · (0,1) + · (1,0) − · (1,1) | ≤ 2 holds in the Kolmogorov axiomatization [14, 15] , where · (a,x∈GF2) denotes the expectation values for x 2 ⊕ x and x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1.
Therefore, the hidden variable model | x 2 + x + 1 H GF2 | ≤ 1 is the upper bound to the correlation between two outcomes of the experiment. According to reasoning assuming local hidden variable theory, the correlation measure cannot exceed the value 2, but there are four states of two-qubits which lead to the maximal value of 2 √ 2.
2.2.1. Remark. Consider the output value of g, {+1, −1}, and its inputs, {0, 1}, so that 0 ∼ +1 and 1 ∼ −1. The correlations x 2 ⊕ x H and x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 H generate the Bell states, and their conjugates, Φ ± and Ψ ± (Eqs. [6] [7] [8] [9] . Let H = {|+ , |− } be the Hadarmad basis of a one-qubit register given by:
For a = x and x = x 2 :
For a = x and N OT (x) = x 2 ⊕ 1: Notice that measuring the first bit of the pairs |Ψ + and |Φ − , in the computational basis yields a 0 or 1 with probability 1 /2. Likewise, measuring its second bit yields the same outcomes with the same probabilities. Therefore, measuring one bit of the maximally entangled two-qubit Bell states yields a random outcome. Hence, we can rewrite the EPR pair |
The measure Pr p(x)≤1 is the probability of factoring (or non-factoring) the Bell states |Ψ + and |Φ − . is the (negligible) probability of factoring the polynomial x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 given the random input x = {0, 1}.
Notice that we can map the elements of the Hadamard basis to the computational basis using the group homomorphism {1, −1, ×} → {0, 1, ⊕}. Then, the exclusive disjunction x ⊕ N OT (x) = x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 can be rewritten as x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 := l'∧¬l", once the field's multiplication operation corresponds to the logical AND operation over the field of two elements. It is not difficult to see that l'∧¬l'= (l'∨l"∨l"') ∧ (¬l'∨¬l"∨¬l"'), with l'= l"= l"', can be written as a 3CNF (conjunctive normal form) clauses, (l'∨l"∨l"')∧(l'∨l"∨¬l"')∧(l'∨¬l"∨l"')∧(l'∨¬l"∨¬l"')∧(¬l'∨l"∨l"')∧ (¬l'∨l"∨¬l"') ∧ (¬l'∨¬l"∨l"') ∧ (¬l'∨¬l"∨¬l"'), which is unsatisfiable. As a result, factoring the polynomial x 2 + x + 1 over GF 2 ||x||=3 is as hard as solving the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT). Try this Fortran code to see:
PROGRAM RANDOM LOGICAL x,y,z y = .
NOT. x z = .TRUE.
x .neqv. y = z WRITE(*,*) x END Is there another programming language able to solve this problem? There is no deterministic way even if we repeat the experiment polynomially many times, since Pr p(x)<1 < 1 over the Boolean ring of all subsets of x (NP complexity).
The sample space poly(x) = x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 is the polynomial representation of the power set F Ω of the universal set Ω = {x', x", x"'}. Its subsets are {} = 000, {x'} = 100, {x"} = 010, {x"'} = 001, {x', x"} = 110, {x', x"'} = 101, {x", x"'} = 011 and {x', x", x"'} = 111, i.e, the Cartesian coordinates of the Euclidean space R 3 (3-dimensional space model of the physical universe) 1 . As the sample size is large enough, the (discrete) distribution 1 /poly(x) over GF 2 , where every element 2 x = −x, converges to the bell-shaped (continuous) curve of the probability density function of the Cauchy distribution, with integral principal value equal to 1 /2 and probability Pr x∈F Ω given by
where the normalizing constant N = 2π 1 /3. The polynomial x 2 + x + 1 > 0 ∈ GF 2 ||x||=3 is asymptotically almost surely a hard-core, once the probability of nonfactoring it converges to unity. This distribution is a heavy-tailed distribution belonging to the subexponential class whose probability density function decreases at a polynomial rate as x → −∞ and x → +∞, as opposed to an exponential rate. Consequently, the probabability of factoring the predicate poly(x) = x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1which is identical to finding a way that 3CNFSAT evaluates to TRUE -is subexponentially bounded making the factorization of poly(x) an NP-complete problem, in accordance with exponential time hypothesis [16] . Thus, it is straightforward to see that the maximally entangled state x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 is a hard-core predicate which is easy to compute given x, but is hard to compute given its output of a single bit. This predicate yields a pseudorandom generator (PRG) with maximum entropy probability [17] , since the input x computed from the output can only be guessed with probability 1 /2. This maximum min-entropy -the smallest entropy measure in the family of Rényi ′ s entropies -is a measure of how correlated the state x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 is.
2.4. Theorem. Let g be a function defined as g(a, x) = (a, h(x)), where the length of a is the same as that of x, and h(x) = f (x)+ax over GF 2 ||x||=3 . The Boolean inner product a ⊕ x a =x provides a one-way function, as well as a PRG, and a hidden bit of the same security [2, 9, 18] . This hard-core predicate of g is the parity function of a random subset of the inputs of g. If the one-to-one correspondence g has a hard-core predicate, then it must be strongly one-way. Hence, the probability of inverting g, Pr g −1 g←g , is the same probability of factoring the hard-core x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1. is the complementary event (Kolmogorov ′ s zero-one law, see proof in [20] ). Then, the probability of inverting g is negligible because the probability of non-factoring g converges to unity, since the probability of factoring the maximally entangled state h(x) = f (x) + ax, with x = a, is less than 1 / x 2 + x + 1 GF2 . Consequently, Pr g −1 g←g approaches zero faster than 1 /poly(x) given the random input x = {0, 1}, where the EPR pair poly(x) = x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 is the only positive polynomial among the 2 3 = 8 polynomials over GF 2 ||x||=3 ; it is important to remember that, evidently, any positive polynomial over GF 2 ||x|| reduces to x 2 ⊕ x ⊕ 1 3 over GF 2 ||x||=3 .
2.5.
Theorem. If P = N P 4 , then, some strongly noninvertible functions are invertible (see proof in [21] ).
2.5.1. Corollary. Let g be the controlled-NOT gate, and its unitary (and Hermitian) matrix written in the form:
The liner operator U CN OT = U −1 CN OT = U T CN OT is orthogonal. Hence, g is involutory: a bijective map that is its own inverse, a mirror symmetry [22] .
2.6. Theorem. Given two sets A and B. If t': A → B and t": B → A are both injections, then, there exists a bijective function A ∼ B (see proof of this Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein theorem in [23, 24] ).
2.6.1. Final remark. As there exists an injective function from the polynomial representation of the power set F Ω to the universal set Ω = {x', x", x"'}, then, the modulo-2 arithmetic A = x 2 + x + 1 is one-one reducible to B = 1. Therefore, A≡ 1 B, that is, A and B are equipollent.
Thus, it is self-evident that the functions and f (x) 5 have information-theoretic security within the same polynomial factor because the 1-equivalence | x 2 + x + 1 H GF2 |≤ m 1 and 1≤ m | x 2 + x + 1 H GF2 | holds, once the power set F Ω has cardinality less than or equal to itself cardinality, | x 2 + x + 1 H GF2 | ≤ | x 2 + x + 1 H GF2 | -there exist injective functions from A into B and from B into A. This condition implies that the strongly one-way function g -function whose (negligible) probability of inverting it approaches zero quickly -exists if the weakly one-way functions f exist -functions whose (noticeable) probability of inverting them does not approach zero too quickly. The reverse is also true, since every strongly one-way function is also weakly one-way [21, 27] . Such an "equalness-of-strength" shows that the problem of determining whether a 3 See a thermodynamic approach of one-wayness of the CNOT gate in [25] . 4 The P ? = N P problem is to determine whether every language accepted by some nondeterministic algorithm in polynomial time is also accepted by some (deterministic) algorithm in polynomial time [26] . P = N P if and only if a total 2-ary one-way functions exists [7, 8] . 5 The functions I(x) = x ≡ x 2 and N OT (x) = x ⊕ 1 ≡ x 2 ⊕ 1 hold. However, x and x ⊕ 1 are irreducible (non-factorable), while x 2 and x 2 ⊕ 1 are reducible (factorable) over GF 2 ||x||=3 .
given state is entangled or separable 6 at least as hard as the hardest problems in NP.
